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The issue of political legitimacy did not always 
dominate the political agenda. In the aftermath 
of the Second World War, political concerns 
were predominantly centred on the economic 
and political viability of nation-states. These 
concerns endured throughout the Cold War 
period when opposing regimes were seen to 
threaten each other’s existence. It was only from 
the late 1960s onwards that questions over 
political legitimacy were being raised. The 
geopolitical pacification of the European 
continent and the increased economic 
interdependence of nation-states allowed for 
alternative concerns to be raised, pertaining to 
the relationship between citizens and their 
rulers. By the late 1970s, scholars like Joseph 
Rothschild began to discuss nation-states’ 
growing difficulties in evoking a sense of trust 
and belonging among the populations being 
governed. Popular interest for political 
legitimacy has increased exponentially ever 
since. Today, a growing number of instruments 
such as the Eurobarometer and the Economist’s 
Democracy Index are devoted to evaluating the 
state of political legitimacy in contemporary 
democracies. These polls indicate that levels of 
political trust are worryingly low. 
What are we to make of these figures? Are our 
political systems nearing a point of collapse? 
The ‘legitimacy deficit’ hypothesis is certainly 
not devoid of controversy. Contrary to the sense 
of disillusionment prevalent in the public debate, 
support for the principles of democracy is both 
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high and widespread. As recent events in the 
European neighbourhood have shown, citizens’ 
aspirations for democracy remain high. Citizens’ 
satisfaction with their democratically elected 
authorities (parliaments, governments and 
parties), by contrast, appears low. Scholars who 
study trends in political support come to 
different conclusions depending on the 
methodologies they use and the cases they 
select. However, they generally agree that low 
levels of political support constitute reason for 
concern. The erosion of support for 
representative institutions – especially 
parliaments – is particularly discomforting. It 
suggests that states are finding it increasingly 
difficult to forge meaningful connections with 
those governed. This difficulty may well lie at 
the heart of the perceived crisis of legitimacy 
that plagues contemporary democracies. 
This Policy Brief takes a closer look into the 
relationship between citizens and the political 
authorities by which they are ruled. It argues 
that changing state-society relations and the 
opening up of non-parliamentary avenues for 
political representation are crucial to 
understanding the feeling of political malaise in 
advanced industrial democracies. More than a 
generalised crisis in legitimacy, our democracies 
face a crisis of legitimation: political choices are 
in dire need of an explanatory narrative that 
binds citizens together. This discussion proceeds 
in four parts. First, we elaborate on what we 
mean by ‘political legitimacy’ and discuss its use 
in public debate. Second, we discuss empirical 
evidence on citizens’ low levels of trust and 
consider the possible explanations for this trend. 
Whether a state is governed well (or not) does 
not always influence the legitimacy of the 
regime. This means that institutional reform is 
no panacea: politics is as much about emotions 
as it is about effective governance. We therefore 
need to pay more attention to the subjective 
dimensions of politics, including culture, shared 
norms and attitudes. Third, today’s growing 
disillusionment with politics reveals both 
citizens’ growing political sophistication and the 
pressures on popular self-governance. The 
growing complexity of politics has eroded the 
belief that citizens are capable of democratic 
control – either through authorising their 
governors or controlling them. We conclude by 
suggesting that citizens need a popular narrative 
that reconfigures the expectations they may hold 
toward power-holders in function of today’s 
politics. Narratives are like social contracts: they 
hold the key for enabling trust in political 
institutions. The present malaise is therefore not 
only about political performance, but also about 
identifying new, shared grounds for political 
legitimation. 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: WHAT’S IN A 
NAME? 
Today’s debates on legitimacy express an 
underlying concern for the stability of political 
systems and their capacity for solving problems. 
As popular protests on Tahrir Square and the 
streets of Kiev have shown, governments only 
exist by the grace of their citizens. All political 
regimes ultimately depend on their subjects’ 
recognition and compliance: citizens must 
accept the rules and laws imposed by their 
government and indeed choose to abide by 
them. A sufficient reservoir of goodwill among 
the population is considered necessary for the 
government to enforce binding decisions. If 
levels of trust fall below a critical threshold, the 
stability of a regime is endangered. Under such 
conditions, the status of its political authorities 
becomes fundamentally contested. In many 
ways, the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed 
Bouazizi set not only himself on fire but also 
burned the very idea of the citizen that 
recognizes his or her government. Of course, 
advanced industrialised democracies are more 
sheltered from such violent outbursts of 
dissatisfaction by greater reservoirs of political 
trust and structures that allow citizens to express 
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their discontent within the system itself. 
However, low levels of citizens’ trust fuel 
anxieties over the possibilities for violent 
protests in Western capitals. 
One can distinguish between two different 
meanings of political legitimacy. Harking back to 
the writings of Max Weber, political legitimacy 
can be analysed descriptively, i.e. by making 
reference to people’s willingness to obey the 
rules enforced on them. People may put faith in 
a particular regime because they have grown 
accustomed to it (tradition), because they have 
faith in its rulers (charisma), or because they 
trust the legality of the regime. Descriptive 
approaches to political legitimacy are typically 
not concerned with discerning whether citizens 
are right or mistaken in trusting their 
government. As David Easton famously 
remarked: ‘Whether the basis of acceptance is 
legitimacy, fear of force, habitat or expediency is 
irrelevant’.  
Measuring political legitimacy is tricky. 
Indications can be found in different forms of 
support, such as citizens’ levels of political 
participation, their active support for 
government actions, or alternative forms of 
adherence (such as the payment of taxes or the 
absence of protests). Despite these various 
manifestations, political legitimacy is most often 
measured as political trust. As a latent belief in the 
appropriateness of the political regime, trust is 
considered vital to the effectiveness of states. As 
argued by Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, trust 
reduces the (monitoring) costs of politics: it 
allows citizens to delegate decision-making 
responsibilities to entrusted others who can then 
make binding decisions on their part. Because it 
reduces the complexity of rule, trust is generally 
conceived as one of the most vital assets of 
democracies. Moreover, societies with higher 
levels of political trust perform better in terms 
of economic and political efficiency than 
societies with lower levels of trust. 
Yet political legitimacy can also be approached 
as a normative question. Instead of merely 
describing declining trust levels, one can specify 
the features a polity must possess for it to be 
considered legitimate. In other words, one can 
focus on the moral appropriateness of different 
forms of rule and of people’s obedience. In 
contrast to descriptive approaches, approaches 
of this kind do elaborate on the conditions 
under which citizens’ trust may be justified – as 
opposed to mistaken. Generally, normative 
scholars introduce a differentiation between de 
facto authorities and legitimate authorities. 
While the authority of political bodies to enforce 
decisions may remain uncontested, their power 
may not be morally justified in the sense of 
meeting democratic principles such as equity, 
procedural fairness, transparency and 
accountability. Theorists such as Ronald 
Dworkin have argued that under such 
conditions, authorities fail to generate genuine 
political obligations. Failure to comply with 
these democratic principles may legitimise the 
choice of citizens to resist and rebel against their 
political authorities. This line of reasoning is also 
evident within the widespread support for the 
so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. 
Beyond the descriptive versus normative 
dichotomy it is possible to focus on the question 
of how legitimacy comes to life and is expressed 
in democratic regimes. Jürgen Habermas first 
drew attention to the social dynamics of 
legitimacy and the active part which citizens and 
political leaders play in producing and 
challenging political legitimacy. While discussing 
political events or the decisions made by their 
authorities, citizens and political leaders 
renegotiate what is morally acceptable and 
defensible. As such they constantly redefine the 
moral foundations of political legitimacy. This 
insight inspired David Beetham to argue that 
political authorities are not legitimate because 
people believe in its legitimacy, but because they 
can be actively justified in terms of their beliefs. 
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This understanding has strongly influenced 
contemporary studies of political trust. Arthur 
Miller and Ola Listhaug have, for instance, 
argued that political trust reflects ‘evaluations of 
whether or not political authorities and institutions are 
performing in accordance with the normative expectations 
held by the public’. When citizens conceive of their 
political authorities as largely responsive to their 
expectations and values, they are able to trust 
and confide in their political leaders. While this 
approach hinges on citizens’ capacity for 
political judgment, it suggests that the low levels 
of trust in the representative institutions of 
advanced industrial democracies reflect a shift in 
citizens’ expectations. Simply put, a trip to the 
polling booth may no longer satisfy the modern 
democratic palate. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON POLITICAL 
SUPPORT: UNDERSTANDING TRENDS 
The dissatisfaction of citizens in advanced 
industrial democracies is predominantly directed 
towards its key representative institutions: 
parliament, government, and political parties. 
The recent study of Carolien van Ham and 
Jacques Thomassen on patterns of political 
support in advanced industrial societies from the 
late 1970s onwards confirms that citizens’ trust 
levels in their political community and the ideal 
of democracy are relatively high and stable. 
Within advanced industrial societies, country 
levels range on average above 80%. Similarly, 
citizens in advanced industrial societies express 
important beliefs in the principles and 
foundations of democracy; displaying country 
averages from 86% to 98%. In comparison, 
their satisfaction with the actual functioning of 
democracy and their support for political 
institutions are substantially lower – on average 
60%. Aggregating data from the late 1970s till 
present, van Ham and Thomassen find that 
support for parliament is stable over time 
(ranging between 40% and 60%). The most 
important declines in parliamentary trust took 
place before the late 1990s. In the recent period, 
evolutions in parliamentary trust have lost 
uniformity: while approximately seven of the 
fifteen countries included in the Eurobarometer 
polls demonstrate significant downward trends 
for parliamentary trust between 1997 and 2012, 
other countries display trendless fluctuations 
over time. Similarly, trust in national 
governments fluctuates strongly across countries 
(from averages of 29% in Italy to 72% in 
Luxembourg). Trust in government, however, 
appears to be declining more clearly towards the 
end of the 2000s, with the onset of the 
economic crisis. In addition, trust in political 
parties is very low in all advanced industrial 
countries; varying between about 20% and 30%.  
These patterns suggest that political support is 
not experiencing a long-term and uniform 
decline in advanced industrial societies. 
Empirically speaking, trust in political 
institutions displays important variation across 
countries and does not reveal a clear pattern of 
decline across time. The underlying causes of 
low political support appear to be far more 
specific than general claims about advanced 
industrial societies allow for. In addition, citizens 
are well able to distinguish between the 
underlying principles and values of political life 
on the one hand and the performance of its 
political authorities on the other. While they 
remain firmly attached to the principles of 
democracy, they increasingly oppose central 
political authorities and feel dissatisfied with the 
policies produced by them. As the latest 
Eurobarometer rapport demonstrates, concerns 
over unemployment and inflation top the list at 
the national, personal and European levels. 
Citizens’ apparent capacity to differentiate their 
adherence to democracy from the performance 
of its real-life institutions has stoked interest in 
the impact of policy outcomes and economic 
performance on levels of citizens’ trust. Simply 
put, does effective governance boost political 
trust? Strangely enough, the evidence is 
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inconclusive. Scholars like Steven Van de Walle 
have not been able to find a significant 
correlation between institutions’ performance 
and citizens’ trust levels. In addition, citizens’ 
perceptions of performance do not always 
correspond with the actual performance of the 
economy or state institutions. If citizens cast 
subjective judgments, then the remedy of 
institutional change can yield only limited 
results. Although efforts to align the functioning 
of government with the challenges of the global 
economy and the growing interdependence of 
politics are in themselves relevant to the stability 
of contemporary democracies, they are unlikely 
to engender spontaneous gains in terms of 
citizens’ trust. Alternative, socio-cultural and 
psychological factors must be taken into 
account. Citizens’ perceptions matter. In times 
of growing societal insecurity, they may matter 
more than states’ GDP or other indicators of 
economic performance. Similarly, the perceived 
fairness of decision-making may outweigh the 
actual impact citizens have on their 
governments. Citizens who are familiar with the 
‘rules of the game’ can probably live with the 
fact that their preferences are not always 
realised, as long as they believe that decisions 
result from a just process.  
The understanding that citizens’ judgment of 
political institutions is closely linked to their 
shared expectations has rekindled interest in 
political culture. The customs, values and beliefs 
that citizens hold have a major impact on their 
political trust. As argued by Marc Hooghe, 
‘political trust can be considered as a comprehensive 
assessment of the political culture that is prevalent within 
a political system, and that is expected to guide the future 
behaviour of all political actors’. The popular 
mistrust of politics may therefore bear witness 
to two distinct phenomena. Firstly, it may signal 
a growing divergence between what citizens 
expect and their rulers’ perceived capacity to 
fulfil their promises. Secondly, citizens’ low trust 
levels may display growing uncertainty over the 
expectations they may hold vis-à-vis their rulers. 
In light of contemporary changes, such as the 
growing interdependence of national politics 
and the global economy, it is reasonable to 
assume that people’s expectation patterns have 
lost stability. Put differently, the rules of the 
political game have become increasingly unclear. 
Popular belief in the realisation of self-
government has effectively eroded because of 
the growing fragmentation, de-territorialisation 
and dislocation of political power. This has left 
citizens puzzled regarding the demands they 
may exercise over their rulers and the type of 
political arrangements necessary for enforcing 
them. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT: 
GROWING INSECURITIES IN A COMPLEX 
AGE 
Discussions of political legitimacy deal with the 
division of labour between those enforcing rule 
on others and those subjected to it. Within 
liberal democracies, this debate relates to the 
practice of political representation. 
Representation ensures that those absent from 
decision-making processes are nevertheless 
included through the actions of their 
representatives. The electoral system is generally 
considered crucial to warranting such inclusion. 
The principle of universal suffrage fosters a 
formal equality that allows all adult citizens to 
participate in government – by authorising and 
sanctioning their representatives. Together with 
citizens’ possibility to stand for elections 
themselves, the principle of universal suffrage is 
considered key in facilitating a sense of 
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. 
Electoral systems are designed with a view to 
allowing citizens to generate the policy 
outcomes they consider invaluable.  
The electoral basis of popular self-governance 
has, however, come under increasing pressure in 
today’s complex age. Because of the enhanced 
interdependence of national politics and the 
global economy, a growing range of political 
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decisions have been moved out of citizens’ 
reach – or even that of their elected appointees. 
When monetary policy made by technocratic 
elites substitutes for democratically unpalatable 
fiscal policies, citizens may justifiably feel bereft 
of control. But a certain loss of control is 
inevitable when dealing with convoluted policy 
problems that represent long-term and 
multidimensional challenges, such as climate 
change and financial regulation. If effective 
solutions involve multilateral agreements and 
broad stakeholder consultations, the relative 
simplicity that characterised politics in the past 
becomes impossible to achieve. 
Citizens’ low political confidence in the 
institutions of the European Union illustrates 
the struggle to come to terms with these long-
distance political relations and multi-level forms 
of governance. A growing number of problems 
require policy reactions above the level of the 
nation-state, but a framework for organising 
supranational democracy is largely absent. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the roadmap towards 
a genuine European Monetary Union drawn up 
by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy includes a plan for action to promote 
democratic legitimacy and political 
accountability on the European level. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the measures 
considered by the EU (such as transparent 
reporting to national parliaments and inter-
parliamentary cooperation) will prove to be a 
sufficient answer to the challenge of democratic 
governance. When decision-making in the 
governing council of the European Central Bank 
continues to demonstrate rifts along national 
lines, for instance, the strains on democracy may 
increase further. The recent ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court on the 
legality of outright monetary transactions makes 
this clear: ‘The democratic decision-making process … 
is undermined when there is a unilateral usurpation of 
powers by institutions and other agencies of the European 
Union.’ 
The complexity of contemporary politics is not 
limited to the international scene. Nation-states 
themselves are characterised by a growing 
pluralisation and fragmentation of representative 
relationships. The democratisation of politics, 
along with citizens’ enhanced political 
sophistication, has opened up regular avenues 
for voice and dissent outside parliament. These 
avenues have brought to the fore an 
unprecedented multitude of affected 
‘constituents’ promoting the interests of non-
territorial and non-partisan groups, such as 
‘women’, ‘consumers’, ‘users’, ‘migrants’, 
‘parents’, and ‘dog-owners’. Although this 
atomisation of ‘the sovereign’ may have 
increased political inclusiveness, it has also made 
discussion on who should be listened to more 
difficult. Similarly, the political sites in which 
citizens’ interests are at stake - e.g. the media, 
the national parliament, civil society etc. - have 
multiplied exponentially. In today’s societies, it 
has become virtually impossible for citizens to 
effectively monitor all the decisions that may 
impact upon their lives.  
Unsurprisingly, today’s pluralisation of political 
constituents and democratic voices has made it 
increasingly difficult for elected representatives 
to read society and set the contours of policy. 
Citizens’ growing involvement in non-
conventional forms of politics (such as civil 
society demonstrations but also, and 
increasingly, social media mobilisations) makes it 
increasingly difficult for representatives to 
determine whose judgment should be taken into 
consideration within decision-making. This 
complexity stands in sharp contrast to the 19th 
century ideal of parliamentary democracy in 
which the popular masses were governed by 
electorally controlled elites and constituted 
themselves clearly identifiable entities. In 
contemporary democracies, by contrast, citizens 
no longer add up to transparent entities. Neither 
are they governed by a neatly identifiable and 
easily controlled set of leaders. Instead, they are 
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governed through vastly complex and changing 
constellations of power-holders; calling the 
original ‘many versus the few’ ratio of 
government into question.  
The complexity of contemporary governance 
mechanisms warrants further proof of citizens’ 
inclusion in the political system. What demands 
may citizens justifiably put on their political 
leaders and by what arrangements may such 
demands be enforced? Besides the obvious 
problem of authorisation and control, these 
evolutions draw attention to the broader 
question whether governance by means of 
popular consent is practically feasible. The 
growing technicality of policy questions 
increasingly requires the involvement of experts, 
even if underlying policy questions may be 
eminently political. The onset of budgetary 
austerity has set the scene for budget battles of 
epic proportions, for example. These 
circumstances require that a new balance 
between technocracy and democracy be 
established. This implies that citizens and 
political leaders should find a renewed 
conformity on the moral foundations of political 
rule and re-specify the actors on which they 
apply. If anything, citizens’ low trust levels 
suggest that this process is still in development. 
In this context it is more appropriate to speak of 
a ‘crisis of legitimation’ than a ‘crisis of 
legitimacy’. Political legitimacy is often 
conceived as a static attribute of political 
institutions and draws attention to their past 
performances. However, the observation that 
the functioning of political institutions is no 
longer attuned to contemporary demands 
contributes little to our understanding of how to 
find a way out of the current political malaise. 
The notion of a ‘crisis of legitimation’, by 
contrast, acknowledges that legitimacy is not a 
fixed characteristic of political institutions. 
Instead, it conceives of legitimacy as a quality 
that must be earned and re-earned constantly. 
This allows us to consider the constant interplay 
(and potential misfit) between what politicians 
claim and what citizens genuinely accept as 
legitimate. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The growing disillusionment with politics calls 
for a redefinition of how power is exercised in a 
complex world. But we must first be clear on 
what the problem is. Drawing from empirical 
evidence on citizens’ trust levels in advanced 
industrial democracies, one can challenge the 
assumption that we are experiencing an 
unprecedented and general crisis of legitimacy. 
Based on data from the 1970s until the present, 
there has not been a general decline of political 
support for democratic ideals in advanced 
industrial societies. In contrast, citizens’ 
confidence in their central political authorities is 
worryingly low – and in some countries 
declining further. 
Far from dismissing the importance and 
potential implications of today’s disillusionment 
with political authorities, we have demonstrated 
the need for greater attention to the subjective 
foundations of political support. In this sense, 
we need to revise the ways in which we 
approach political legitimacy. Too often, 
political legitimacy is conceived as the result of 
past habits and accomplished rights and 
obligations. Such views dismiss the insight that 
political legitimacy is never fully given but 
requires constant legitimation. The need for 
perpetual renegotiation of the conditions to 
legitimate authority alerts us to the fact that, 
over time, the conditions under which 
individuals are willing to concede legitimacy may 
alter or, at least, become subject of debate. 
In this Brief, we have argued that we are 
experiencing such a turning point today. The 
feeling of political malaise can be traced back to 
new forms of policy articulation in our 
globalised yet fragmented societies. While 
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citizens’ enhanced political sophistication has 
altered the input side of politics – opening up 
alternative, non-electoral avenues for voice and 
dissent – the growing interdependence of global 
politics has implied a transfer of decision-
making powers to supranational levels. Both 
changes have implied an exponential 
multiplication of the political sites in which 
citizens’ interests are at stake. This makes it 
virtually impossible for citizens to effectively 
control all decisions that may impact upon their 
lives. At the same time, citizens increasingly 
become political representatives themselves; 
representing views and beliefs outside the 
parliamentary arena. These new forms of policy 
articulation and delivery have not only made 
politics more complex, they have also 
contributed to citizens’ feelings of insecurity; 
thereby making trust an increasingly scarce 
commodity. Yet trust is necessary to enable this 
complex and elusive system of governance to 
function. In this sense, the endurance of low 
levels of citizens’ trust may indicate a ‘crisis of 
legitimation’. In the face of changing politics, the 
principle of electoral self-governance has been 
effectively unwound. New narratives of 
legitimation are needed. However, both political 
authorities and citizens appear apprehensive 
about redefining the moral grounds for civil 
obedience to power and the practical 
arrangements these require. 
What may such a redefinition look like? The 
economic crisis – and the issue of youth 
unemployment in particular – is effectively 
setting the scene for a return of public interest 
in politics. At the same time, there is a clear 
appetite for simplicity: the narrative of 
complexity has too often been used as a 
smokescreen masking the proverbial 
inconvenient truth. What is clear is that 
accountability is crucial: citizens will fight for a 
minimal ability to check policy choices and the 
ability to cast their vote in one way or another. 
This can be in the polling booth, but perhaps 
migration patterns amongst the young and 
educated offer the starkest picture of public 
satisfaction with government. In addition, 
debate is needed on what constitutes the public 
interest. Both the legislative and the executive 
branches of government must make a case that 
they can offer a wider view on society, i.e. one 
that goes beyond private and sectorial interests. 
In essence, governments need to communicate 
the idea that they can provide something truly 
unique: a level playing field for all law-abiding 
citizens, a source for investment in societal and 
technological infrastructure, and a minimal 
shield against external interference. The added 
value of thinking in terms of a ‘crisis of 
legitimation’ – as opposed to a ‘crisis of 
legitimacy’ – lies precisely here: it allows us to 
consider discourses of this kind, and their 
reception by various relevant audiences. As 
such, it encourages us to think beyond the need 
for functional and institutional changes and to 
also consider the relevance of legitimating 
narratives. If the notion of popular governance 
is to mean anything, we need a story explaining 
how it may be attained in today’s complex age. 
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